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1 Introduction
It has been long noticed that asymmetric information and limited commitment are key fric-
tions, which should be considered seriously to understand credit market performance. Thus
many papers have investigated the intensive margin in credit supply, i.e., the terms of loan
agreements, through the lens of the literature on contracting under asymmetric information.
However they have paid little attention to the extensive margin, i.e., the probability that a
potential borrower gets a loan. In existing works based on contract theory, if necessary, the
extensive margin has been modeled by a randomized contracting strategy together with a
contractual term that indicates the probability with which the other terms are o¤ered. This
scheme introducing the articial term into the intensive margin might be considered as a
reduced-form approach to modelling the extensive margin because it is not explicit about
costs and benets of extending credit supply.
This paper develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden infor-
mation and limited commitment. This model is explicit about the extensive margin while
using the standard bilateral contracting framework for the intensive margin, and hence it
allows us to see how two margins jointly channel the inuences of the credit frictions. More
specically, introducing the friction in competitive search theory, this paper extends the work
by Besanko and Thakor (1987) on a competitive credit market under hidden information.
The equilibrium concept proposed by Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) is used for this.
In the model of this paper, lending is carried out through banks, which are principals that
design credit policies, or mechanisms o¤ering credit contracts. Each bank can serve many
borrowers at once, but it costs to increase the maximum number of borrowers it can serve. In
order to introduce this capacity constraint associated with bilateral contracting, the notion
of vacancy in search-theoretic labor market models is adopted, and bilateral matching of a
borrower and a vacancy is assumed. This bilateral matching itself does not necessarily mean
a search friction. However here the credit market is assumed to have a search friction, which
makes both sides of the market left unmatched, though the sources of the friction might be
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di¤erent from those in a typical decentralized market. Banks with vacancies publicly and
credibly announce their credit policies, advertising the vacancies. They wait for applicants
to visit because they cannot locate potential borrowers. A potential borrowers observes all
the policies available and choose for which one to apply. Because it takes time and resources
to access and process loan application, he cannot approach more than a few banks, or a
fraction of the vacancies, within a given period of time. This imperfect matching technology
leads to the search friction in spirit same to Moen (1997).
In the competitive search credit market, banks compete with each other, and free entry
of vacancies leads to zero prots as in the large literature on competitive credit market
and competitive banking. Though this might be an extreme assumption, it a¤ords decisive
advantages in tractability to consider an equilibrium in which banks take possible responses of
other banks into consideration. It might be noticeable that a competitive search equilibrium
can be considered as a possible solution to the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) nonexistence
problem. Moreover the assumption allows us to focus on the roles for asymmetric information
because a competitive search market under full information yields the rst best allocation.
Once a search friction exists, any other market structure, for example, a typical search
market with bargaining, generically has an ine¢ cient allocation even under full information.
Thus it looks essential to investigate a competitive search equilibrium allocation rst before
investigating allocations under alternative market structures.
Results of this paper exhibit the possibility of endogenous credit rationing in the extensive
margin, i.e., pure Type II credit rationing. This does not indicate the possibility that a
potential borrowers fails to receive credit simply due to the search friction, or an unmodeled
characteristic. Given imperfect matching technology and capacity expansion costs, banks
in the competitive search market would supply the socially optimal levels of credit if there
were no informational frictions. However, under hidden information, the supply of credit in
it may be not e¢ cient because the terms of a contract themselves a¤ect the riskiness of the
loan by sorting potential borrowers. A key nding is the possibility that potential borrowers
are rationed because banks charge interests more than the e¢ cient levels for the purpose of
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screening. This is a feature distinguished from the results of existing works on a competitive
credit market under hidden information because here credit rationing is not due to lack of
screening but rather a result of screening.1
The results also demonstrate the possibility that unproductive banking as well as lack
of collateral makes the credit market tight, extending interest rate spreads. This possibility
might be important for understanding the occurrence of a credit crunch. For example, when
banks have more di¢ culties in nding qualied borrowers, the tightness of credit market
may be endogenously amplied. The possibility also helps to understand small enterprises
limited access to bank nance, simply assuming that the entire credit market consists of
many submarkets separated by observable characteristics of rms.2 For example, it explains
why a credit market in which rms with less collateralable wealth participate is more tight
and has larger interest rate spreads.
Another key nding is the possibility of contract dispersion among homogenous borrowers
of the same type. This possibility arises under a standard environment, which would yield
no dispersion if there were no search frictions, or if information were symmetric. This sheds
light on and explains the possibility that sunspots a¤ect the distribution of credit supply as
well as the possibility that imperfect banking enhances interest rate dispersion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 denes equilibrium and introduces a way to characterize it. Section 4 characterizes equi-
librium and investigates the results. Section 4 gives concluding remarks. All proofs of the
lemmas and the propositions are in the Appendix.
1Though some of Stiglitz-Weiss papers (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) demonstrates possibility of pure
credit rationing under hidden information, this rationing is a pooling or semi-pooling equilibrium phenom-
enon. As pointed out by Bester (1985), the possibility is due to lack of screening, and it disappears if banks
have a screening device that yields a separating equilibrium. Introducing the search friction into a standard
environment, this paper provides an account for a separating equilibrium with pure credit rationing.
2There are many empirical studies about this limited access, in which main sources of banksreluctance
to extend credit to small enterprises has been discussed (e.g., Green, 2003). Their reluctance is considered
as mainly associated with high administrative costs of small-scale lending, asymmetric information, small
rms lack of collateral, the high risk perception attributed to small enterprises, and the underdeveloped
nancial system. This paper provides a model that allows to see how these sources work together.
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2 Model
The model incorporates the friction in competitive search theory into a standard one-period
credit market model with hidden information. For easier comparison, the standard part
follows Besanko and Thakor (1987), hereafter BT. There is a continuum of potential bor-
rowers with total mass normalized to one, and a large number of ex ante homogenous banks
compete in the supply of loans. Both borrowers and banks are risk neutral.
Each borrower owns a project and has a type  2 (0; 1]. If a type  borrower invests an
initial outlay of q, his project yields a gross return of f (q; ) with probability  and zero with
probability 1 . The function f : R+ [0; 1] 7! R+ is twice continuously di¤erentiable, fq >
0, and fqq < 0 with f (0; ) = 0, limq!0 fq (q; ) =1 and limq!1 fq (q; ) = 0 for every . It
is also assumed that f > 0 and fq > 0. The distribution of borrower types is concentrated
on D  [0; I ] with a continuous probability density function g : D 7! R++  (0;1). In
addition to income that can be earned by investment, all the borrowers have a deterministic
and identical end-of-period wealth .3 However, this wealth is illiquid, and hence a borrower
who wants to nance investment must approach a bank for a loan. All of f , g and  are
common knowledge, but each borrowers type is his private information.4
Banks participate in the market by creating vacancies and posting a credit policy for
each. A credit policy is a mechanism of which execution determines what credit contract is
o¤ered, where a credit contract is a vector (q; x; k) 2 R2+  [0; ] that species the loan size
q, the repayment x, and the collateral requirement k. The posting of a policy means that
the bank publicly announces and commits to the policy. The capacity of each vacancy is
one borrower, and there is a sunk cost  2 R++ associated with the creation of a vacancy.5
3As discussed in the introduction, heterogeneity in collateralable wealth could be easily introduced by
assuming that the entire credit market consists of many submarket separated by observable characteristics
of potential borrowers. These submarkets would operate independently under the model environment.
4It is also assumed that there is no way in the model for any information about the type of a borrower
to be credibly revealed, except possibly by self-selection. This is to focus on the role of borrowersdirected
search in information transfer through banksscreening. Borrowerssignaling in the model directs banks
search, and this e¤ect can conict with its role for information transfer (see Delacroix and Shi, 2007).
5The vacancy creation requires time and resources as in search-theoretic labor market models. It might
have two kinds of costs: one is to enhance capacity, employing labor and capital for additional loan processing,
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Notice that  represents the constant marginal cost of banks capacity expansion. Taking as
given the probability that each vacancy is lled with a borrower, banks can create vacancies
as many as they wants. Banks nance their loans from loanable deposit funds, of which
supply is perfectly elastic at the exogenous gross interest rate  2 R++. Thus the interest
rate spread in lending with credit contract (q; x; k) is x=q   .
Each borrower can see all the credit policies posted, and then he chooses for which one to
apply or decides not to participate in the market.6 The set of vacancies with a certain policy
and the set of borrowers applying for the policy form a submarket. Matching is bilateral,
and the mass of matches in each submarket is determined by a standard constant returns to
scale matching technology that captures a search friction.7 If the vacancy-applicant ratio, or
market tightness, in a submarket is  2 R+  [0;1], an applicant to the policy matches with
a vacancy with probability  (), and a vacancy is lled with an applicant with probability
 ()   () =. The function  : R+ 7! [0; 1] is twice continuously di¤erentiable, 0 > 0,
00 < 0,  (0) = 0, and  (1) = 1. It is also assumed that  (0) = 0 (0) = 1. If a vacancy
is lled with an applicant, its credit policy is executed, and the pair of the bank and the
borrower enter into the resulted contract.8
If a type  borrower obtains a contract c = (q; x; k), his expected surplus is
u (c; )   [f (q; )  x]  (1  )min fx; kg :
and the other is to search for an additional borrower, for example, by making advertisement.
6If a borrower chooses a credit policy for which to apply, he approaches banks searching for a vacancy
with the policy. Here it is assumed that each borrower approaches banks for only one policy although he
is allowed to randomize his choice in case that he is indi¤erent about which one to apply for. Anyhow this
restriction is not essential to the results. As noted by Moen (1997), we can allow the case where borrowers
search for vacancies with di¤erent policies by introducing their search intensity for each policy and adjusting
their contribution to the matching in each submarket.
7If there were no friction other than the capacity constraint associated with bilateral matching technology,
the short side of the market would be assured of matching. However here it is assumed that there exists a
search friction that makes both sides left unmatched simultaneously. As discussed in the introduction, the
sources of this friction can be time delays and costs due to the completion and processing of applications as
well as those due to the construction of relationship with banks and unmodeled heterogeneities.
8After the mechanism has been executed, the bank always o¤ers the resulted contract because of a law
or reputation e¤ects. Then the borrower always accepts the contract in equilibrium although he could reject
it. He does not try to negotiate it since his bargaining power is assumed to be too small to improve it.
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For banks, the expected surplus from entering into the contract with a type  borrower is
v (c; )  x+ (1  )min fx; kg   q:
Notice that here limited commitment is assumed: borrowers may choose to default when their
project failed. Banks attempt to overcome this possibility with the collateral requirement.9
Implementing the contract with a type  borrower generates total expected surplus
S (q; )  f (q; )  q:
Dene q? : D 7! R++ and S? : D 7! R++ such that
fq (q
? () ; ) = ; S? () = S (q? () ; ) ; 8:
For all , q? () = argmaxq2R+ S (q; ) and S
? () = maxq2R+ S (q; ). Assume that
S? () + (1  )min fS? () ;   q? ()g > ; 8 (1)
to ensure the existence of mutually benecial contract for every type.10
Dene q : D 7! R++ such that S (q () ; ) = 0 for every . For each , S (q () ; ) > 0 if
and only if 0 < q < q (). In addition, both q and S? are strictly increasing. Thus there is
no loss of generality in restricting the set of feasible credit contracts to
C  [0; q (I)] [0; S? (I)] [0; ] :
Moreover, by the revelation principle, banks can without loss restrict themselves to incentive-
compatible direct mechanisms in searching for an optimal policy. Hence there is no loss of
generality in restricting the set of feasible credit policies to
C  fc : D 7! C j u (c () ; )  u (c (0) ; ) ; 8; 0 2 Dg :
9The actual realized return on a borrowers project is his private information that is not veriable to
banks. However, as in BT, banks are able to notice whether his project succeeded or not. For justication,
one can assume that borrowers cannot abscond with any wealth at the end of period, though they default
whenever optimal. Then in equilibrium no borrower defaults when his project succeeded.
10The denition of equilibrium in the next section does not require all the types to satisfy this condition.
Thus, relaxing the assumption, one can investigate the e¤ect of a change in the model parameters on the
cuto¤ type of market participation. However, like BT, pursuing this is not the subject of this paper.
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A credit policy species that, if a vacancy is lled with a borrower, the borrower truthfully
announces his type  and the contractc () is implemented.
For each credit policy c 2 C, let #p (c) indicate the vacancy-applicant ratio in the sub-
market for the policy. Given beliefs about #p : C 7! R+, the expected surplus for a type 
borrower applying to a policyc 2 C is
Up (c; ;#p)   (#p (c))u (c () ; ) :
Let p (c; ) denote the probability measure that represents the distribution of the types of
applicants to policyc. The measure is dened on the Borel set of D, denoted by BD, and for
any D0 2 BD, p (c;D0) indicates the share of applicants to the policy whose type is  2 D0.
Given beliefs about #p : C 7! R+ and p : C BD 7! [0; 1], the expected prot from creating
a vacancy o¤ering a policyc 2 C is
p (c;#p;p)   (#p (c))
Z
v (c () ; ) p (c; d)  :
Notice that both #p and p are dened on the set of all revelation policies. Though most
of them are not posted in equilibrium, but it is still necessary to dene beliefs about the
vacancy-applicant ratio and the types of applicants to those policies if they were posted.
The timing of events is as follows. At Stage 0, nature draws a type for each borrower,
and borrowers learn their own types. At Stage 1, banks create vacancies and post credit
policies under their beliefs about #p and p. At Stage 2, every borrower observes what banks
post and then applies to at most one policy under his beliefs about #p. At Stage 3, borrowers
and vacancies in each submarket are matched according to the matching process. At Stage
4, each borrower matched with a vacancy announces his type, and the pair implement the
contract for the type. An outcome in the model is G : D  BC 7! R+, where G (; ) is the
measure that species how many type  borrowers obtain each contract: G (; C0) indicates
total mass of contracts in C0 obtained by type , or equivalently, the mass of type  borrowers
obtain some contract in C0.
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3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used here is competitive search equilibrium under asymmetric in-
formation introduced by Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), hereafter GSW. To focus on
equilibrium outcomes, following GSW, let a competitive search equilibrium be dened in a
restricted model. It will be shown that, in terms of outcomes, an equilibrium in this model
is equivalent to a competitive search equilibrium in the unrestricted model.
In the restricted model, banks post a single contract rather than a policy for each vacancy
they create, and each borrower applies to a single contract he likes or does not participate
in the market. For each credit contract c 2 C, let # (c) indicate the the vacancy-applicant
ratio at the contract. Given beliefs about # : C 7! R+, the expected surplus for a type 
borrower applying to a contract c 2 C is
U (c; ;#)   (# (c))u (c; ) .
Put U (?; ;#) = 0 for all , letting the null contract ? represent the outside option for
borrowers not to participate in the market. For each contract c 2 C, let  (c;D0) indicate
the share of applicants to the contract whose type is  2 D0, and let  (c; ) be the probability
density function associated with  (c; ), dened by the Radon-Nikodym derivative of  (c; )
with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Given beliefs about # : C 7! R+ and  : C  BD 7!
[0; 1], the expected prot from posting a contract c 2 C is
 (c;#;)   (# (c))
Z
v (c; )  (c; d)  :
Put  (# (?)) v (?; ) =  for all , letting the null contract also represent the outside option
for banks not to create a vacancy. Let 	 : BC 7! R+ be the measure that species how many
each contract banks post: 	(C0) indicates the mass of contracts in C0 posted by all banks.
Its support C	 represents the set of contracts actually posted.
Denition 1. A competitive search equilibrium is a list of functions f	; #;; Ug, where 	
is a measure on BC with support C	, # : C 7! R+,  (c; ) is a probability measure on BD
for every c 2 C, and U : D 7! R+, that satises the following conditions:
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(i) For every (c; ) 2 C  D, U (c; ;#)  U ()  maxc^2C	[f?g U (c^; ;#), with equality
and u (c; )  0 if # (c) <1 and  (c; ) > 0,
(ii) For every c 2 C,  (c;#;)  0, with equality if c 2 C	
(iii) For every  2 D, R
C	
[ (c; ) =# (c)] 	 (dc)  g (), with equality if U () > 0.
Denition 2. An allocation is a list of functions f	; ~#; ~; Ug, where 	 is a measure on BC
with support C	, ~# : C	 7! R+, ~ (c; ) is a probability measure on BD for every c 2 C	, and
U : D 7! R+. The allocation of a competitive search equilibrium f	; #;; Ug is f	; ~#; ~; Ug,
where ~# and ~ are the restricted domain functions of # and  respectively.
An allocation f	; ~#; ~; Ug species aggregate decisions, an outcome, and implied payo¤s.
The allocation of vacancies 	 depicts banksaggregate decisions. LetH (; ) be the measure
that species how many type  borrowers apply to each posted contract: for every C0 2 BC	,
H (; C0) indicates the mass of type  borrowers apply to some contract in C0. The allocation
of borrowers H : D  BC 7! R+ describes borrowersaggregate decisions and is given by
H (; C0) =
Z
C0
[~ (c; ) =~# (c)]	 (dc) ; 8 2 D; C0 2 BC	 :
The outcome G is determined by H as well as the trading function   ~# : C	 7! [0; 1], which
species the share of applicants to each posted contract who success to obtain it, and the
payo¤ function U : D 7! R+ indicates the expected surplus of each type from the outcome.
Denition 3. An allocation f	; ~#; ~; Ug is attainable if
(i) For every (c; ) 2 C	 D such that ~ (c; ) > 0, U(c; ; ~#) = U ();
(ii) For every c 2 C	, (c; ~#; ~) = 0;
(iii) For every  2 D, R
C	
[~ (c; ) =~# (c)]	 (dc)  g (), with equality if U () > 0.
Clearly a competitive search equilibrium has an attainable allocation. The zero prot
condition (ii) in Denition 3 implies that banksprot maximization and their competition
under free entry of vacancies lead to zero expected prots from any posted contract. Since
# (c) =1 makes negative prot  , it also implies that every posted contract has a positive
mass of applicants: ~# (c) < 1 for all c 2 C	. The borrowersoptimality condition (i) then
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implies that, if a borrower applies to a posted contract, this choice over all the contracts
posted is optimal for his type. The market clearing condition (iii) implies that every borrower
applies to a posted contract unless his type is indi¤erent about participating in the market.
Notice that not every attainable allocation is of equilibrium, the denition of which
imposes restrictions on contracts not posted in equilibrium, i.e., c =2 C	. To show the role
for these restrictions, introduce some additional notations. Given equilibrium payo¤ function
U , for every contract c and type , let P (c; )  p 2 R++ j pu (c; )  U ()	, and dene
p (c; )  inf P (c; ).11 In addition, let p (c)  inf2D p (c; ). Among all the types, we could
say, a type  is most likely to apply for a contract c if p (c; ) = p (c)  1, in the sense that
this type borrowers are willing to do so at the highest rationing probability 1   (# (c)).
Lemma 1. In any competitive search equilibrium f	; #;; Ug,  (# (c)) = p (c) if p (c)  1,
and # (c) =1 otherwise. Moreover, if p (c)  1 and p (c; ) > p (c),  (c; ) = 0.
Arguing by analogy with the forward induction, the equilibrium conditions in Denition
1 require that an equilibrium must not be supported by implausible beliefs about # and  on
contracts not posted.12 Following the equilibrium renement proposed by Gale (1996), equi-
librium condition (i) restricts banksbeliefs about the composition of borrowers attracted
to a deviating contract, imposing that their probability assessment of its implementation
should be concentrated on the set of types most likely to apply for it.13 In addition, banks
should anticipate that the market tightness will make such types indi¤erent about applying
for it. Imposing these restrictions on all the possible deviations pins down # and . Equi-
11Notice that the inmum is taken over p > 0. This is to preclude that a type  with U () = 0 is dened
to be most likely to apply for a contract c such that u (c; ) < 0.
12For concreteness, consider an equilibrium candidate, and suppose that it is protable for banks to post a
deviating contract c =2 C	 as long as this contract attracts the types most likely to apply for it, inducing the
highest probability of success to implement it. Nevertheless it is possible that the candidate has an attainable
allocation, the denition of which allows arbitrary beliefs about # (c) and  (c; ), if banks anticipate that
the contract will attract borrowers whose application requires a low level of the market tightness, making
the deviation unprotable. However such beliefs would be refuted once a bank did post the contract and
borrowers take the reason for this deviation into account in forming their beliefs about the market tightness.
Such beliefs are implausible since they could survive only if banks did not perceive this.
13As shown in Lemma 1, for any contract c 2 C such that # (c) <1, banksbelief about the distribution
 (c; ) should put zero weights on all the types that are not most likely to apply for it. As pointed out by
Gale (1996), this is analogous to the "universal divinity" renement proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987).
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librium condition (ii) then imposes that, given these # and , no deviating contract could
yield positive prot in an equilibrium.
Notice that an attainable allocation might not be of equilibrium if some posted contract
attracts more than two types, with some of which entering into it makes negative expected
prots. Suppose that banks post such non-distorting pooling contract in a proposed equilib-
rium, same in spirit to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Since this contract cross-subsidizes
low types at the expense of high types, low types have more to gain from the deviation and
are, therefore, the ones who actually search for the deviating contract. Thus the proposed
equilibrium is not destroyed by the possibility of such deviation, which is supported by the
belief that only bad types search for deviating contracts. To destroy a proposed equilibrium,
together with borrowers who can freely redirect their search, it must be possible for a bank
to post a deviating contract that will be strictly protable and that will not become strictly
unprotable even if other banks are allowed to deviate by posting still more contracts. This
implies that competitive search equilibrium might be regarded as a version of Rileys reac-
tive equilibrium (Riley, 1979) with the Pareto-dominating strongly informationally consistent
(SINC) outcome.14 Formalize this idea to nd a way to characterize equilibrium allocations.
Denition 4. An allocation f	; ~#; ~; Ug is SINC if it is attainable, and for every (c; ) 2
C	 D such that ~ (c; ) > 0, (~# (c))v (c; )  .
Consider an allocation f	; ~#; ~; Ug. Let C ()  fc 2 C	 j ~ (c; ) > 0g, and dene
C () by C ()  C () or C ()  f?g if C () = ;. The allocation is SINC if and only if,
for all ; 0 2 D and c (0) 2 C (0), every c () 2 C () satises
14It might be noticeable that the universal divinity renement, to which the requirement of equilibrium
condition (i) is analogous, selects the "Riley outcome" in a standard signalling game. To be concrete, we
might imagine the following hypothetical adjustment process. Given contracts posted by banks, borrowers
choose not only to which contract to apply but also which vacancy they approach for the contract. Applicants
who approach each vacancy form a queue in front of it. After all borrowers make the decision, they are given
the opportunity to change the contract to which they apply as well as the vacancy at which they apply. If
any borrower moves, borrowers are given a further opportunity to move, and so on, until no borrower moves.
And then banks are given the opportunity to post new contracts. If any bank posts a new contract, banks
are given a further opportunity to post, and so on, until no bank posts any new contracts. Then borrower
are given the opportunity to move one more time, and this process iterates until neither any borrower nor
any bank moves. After the process ends, borrowers approach the vacancies nally chosen to apply for a loan.
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(C1) U () =  ( ())u (c () ; ); (C2) U ()   ( (0))u (c (0) ; );
(C3)  ( ()) v (c () ; ) = ; (C4) c () 2 C [ f?g,  () 2 R+, U () 2 R+
where  ()  ~# (c ()). Thus one can nd a Pareto dominating SINC allocation by solving
(P) max
U();c();()
Z I
0
U () g^ () d
subject to (C1)-(C4) for all ; 0 2 D, where g^ : D 7! R++ is a continuos density function that
assigns welfare weights. Notice that (P) is an optimal control problem with the state U ()
and the control   ()  (c () ;  ()). As will be shown in the next section, this problem can
be restated as a standard program, to which a solution has the form of state-control trajectory
( U; ), a single-valued vector function with U : D 7! R+ and   : D 7! (C [ f?g) R+.
Lemma 2. A solution to (P) exists. Every solution has the same state trajectory U such
that U () > 0 for all .
The above lemma states that there exists a Pareto dominating SINC allocation. Moreover
it is unique in terms of payo¤s. Let f	; ~#; ~; Ug be a Pareto dominating SINC allocation
associate with a single solution ( U; ). The support of 	, or the set of posted contracts is
C	 = c (D). Take an arbitrary posted contract c 2 C	, and x it. In the next section, it will
be shown that only one type applies for each posted contract. Thus there exists unique  such
that c = c (). The vacancy-applicant ratio at the contract is ~# (c) =  (), and ~ (c; ) is the
Dirac measure at point . The market clearing condition then implies that  (c) =  () g (),
where  is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of 	 with respect to the Lebesgue measure. The
payo¤ function U is the same to the optimal state trajectory. As will be shown in the next
section, however an optimal control trajectory is not necessarily unique. Consider a Pareto
dominating SINC allocation associate with a pair of solutions ( U; 0); ( U; 1). In this case,
for each c 2 C	, there exists unique  such that c 2 fc0 () ; c1 ()g, and ~ (c; ) is the Dirac
measure at point . The market clearing condition implies that
P
i  (ci ()) =i () = g ().
Notice that the allocation of vacancies 	 is not pinned down because banksbeliefs about
the distribution of type  applicants over the indi¤erent contracts c0 () ; c1 () is arbitrary.
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The next proposition establishes that the model has outcomes characterized by solutions
to (P), and that hence they are equivalent in terms of payo¤s. This follows directly from
results in GSW. See the proof of Lemma 2. In an equilibrium, the type distribution g only
a¤ects the allocation of vacancies 	. As pointed out by GSW, this is consistent with known
results in competitive search models with heterogenous agents (e.g. Moen, 1997).15
Proposition 1. A competitive search equilibrium exists, and any competitive search equilib-
rium has a Pareto dominating SINC allocation.
The next proposition implies that the restriction to contract posting is without loss
of generality in terms of outcomes. The denition of competitive search equilibrium with
revelation policies is provided in its proof.
Proposition 2. Any competitive search equilibrium with contract posting is a competitive
search equilibrium with revelation policies. Any competitive search equilibrium with revelation
policies has the outcome same to a competitive search equilibrium with contract posting.
4 Characterization
To solve (P), rst restate it in the form of a standard program. The denitional constraint
on payo¤s (C1) can be written as
U () =  ( ()) [f (q () ; )  x () + (1  ) y ()] ; (2)
where y ()  max fx ()  k () ; 0g. As is standard in optimal mechanism design, write the
incentive compatibility constraint (C2) as
U () = max
^2D
U(^; )  ((^))[f(q(^); )  x(^) + (1  ) y(^)]:
By the envelope theorem, the rst order condition U^(; ) = 0 is equivalent to
U 0 () =  ( ()) [f (q () ; ) + fq (q () ; )  y ()] : (3)
15A solution to (P) is not a¤ected by g^, implying that the Pareto dominating SINC allocation is independent
of the welfare weights as in BT. This is because (P) has an equivalent representation in a recursive structure.
See the proof of Lemma 2.
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Since the rst order condition is only local and not su¢ cient even locally, so is (3). The next
lemma provides a su¢ cient condition under which it replaces the global constraint (C2). In
addition, if the condition holds as the inequality almost everywhere, then that only one type
applies for each posted contract.
Lemma 3. Let (3) be satised for almost every  and (C1) for all . Then (C2) hold for all
; 0 if U 0 ()  0 for almost every .
Notice that the zero prot condition (C3) can be written as
y () = (1  ) 1 [x ()  q ()   ( ())] ; (4)
where  ()  = () = 1= (), and that this is equivalent to
x ()  q () +  ( ()) ; (5a)
x () + (1  ) k ()  q () +  ( ()) ; (5b)
with either (5a) or (5b) holding as an equality. Substituting (4) into (2) and (3) results in
U ()   ( ())S (q () ; )   () ; (6)
U 0 () =  ( ())

S (q () ; )  (1  ) 1 fx ()  q ()g

+ (1  ) 1  () ; (7)
with (6) holding as the equality, respectively.
Now (P) can be restated as follows. Maximize the objective function subject to, for all ,
(5a), (5b), with either holding as an equality, (6), 0  k ()  , and for almost every , (7).
Lemma 2 allows us not to deal with the state-space constraint U ()  0, establishing that it
never binds for any  in a solution. In addition, as shown in its proof, if the nonnegative prot
condition were introduced, it would be never slack. Hence the solution remains unchanged
by replacing the equality constraint with (6). As is usual, solve the relaxed problem obtained
by ignoring that (7) is not su¢ cient. It will be shown that a resulting solution satises the
condition in Lemma 3.
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4.1 Full Information Benchmark
First describe the allocation that would arise under full information, the case in which banks
observe each applicants type, as a benchmark.
A full information allocation is a Pareto optimum and is characterized by ( U?; ?) that
solves (P) without the incentive compatibility constraint (7). In a solution, the loan size and
the market tightness for each type is given by
(q? () ; ? ()) = arg max
(q;)2R+
f ()S (q () ; )  g ; 8: (8)
Here an optimal choice of q does not depend on the level of . Thus q? : D 7! R++ dened
before constitutes a solution. Given q?, ? : D 7! R++ is characterized by
0 (? ())S? () = ; 8: (9)
Each borrower receives a loan that maximizes the expected social surplus of his project with
the socially optimal probability given matching technology and capacity expansion costs.
Plugging (C3) into (9), we see that
v (c? () ; ) =S? () = 0 (? ()) ? () = (? ()) ; 8;
where the elasticity in the right hand side measures bankscontribution to borrowersprob-
ability of transaction. This demonstrates that, for all , c? () endogenously satises the
famous Hosios condition (Hosios, 1990): entry is e¢ cient if and only if agentsshare of the
surplus from trade equals the elasticity. As pointed out by Rocheteau and Wright (2005),
under full information, the competitive search market structure internalizes the optimality
conditions in both intensive and extensive margins.
Lemma 4. Dene  such that S?() = . Let    if q?()   and   1 if q?(1)  .
Then there exists unique  2 [; 1] such that q? () +  (? ()) >  if and only if  > .
For each type, the collateral requirement maximizes expected prot given interest rate,
while the interest rate yields zero expected prots given collateral requirement. Notice that
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we have restricted attention on the case all  > . By the zero prot condition, for   ,
x? () = q? () +  (? ()) ; k? ()  q? () +  (? ()) :
The size of collateral requirement is arbitrary as long as k? ()  x? (), but a dispersion due
to this arbitrariness is immaterial. Assume that these payo¤ equivalent contracts are traded
in the same submarket. For  > , the zero prot condition yields
x? () =  1 [q? () +  (? ())  (1  )] > q? () +  (? ()) ; k? () = :
Here  is a cuto¤ success probability. Assume that 0 <  < I in what follows. A borrower
with a success probability lower than the cuto¤makes small investments and pays the riskless
rate and the spread due to banks administrative costs only. Limited commitment does not
matter for this kind of high-risk borrowers because they o¤er enough collateral to ensure
full loan repayment. However a borrower with a higher success probability makes larger
investments and puts up all of his collateralable wealth as collateral. Given collateralable
wealth, he has a positive probability of default. The interest rate spread includes a default
premium that compensates the bank for this risk.
A positive probability that a borrower fails to obtain a mutually benecial contract under
full information is not pure credit rationingbut close to redlining(see Stiglitz and Weiss,
1987). Moreover this probability is socially optimal. However it might be noticeable that
interest rate spreads are a¤ected by such probabilities because interest rates compensate
banks for costs of creating all vacancies, though some of them fail to sell a contract.
4.2 Allocation under Asymmetric Information
To describe the equilibrium allocation, investigate the optimal control solution to (P) sepa-
rately over [0;  ] and (; I ] and then join the two solutions.
First consider the problem same to (P) but only with  2 [0;  ]. Its solution is the same
to the part of solution to (P) over [0;  ] because (P) has the recursive structure previously
mentioned. The following proposition shows that, in a competitive search equilibrium, every
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type    obtains the rst-best contract with the socially optimal probability as it would
under full information. This is the same to the result in BT, though the full information
allocation as well as the cuto¤ probability is di¤erent.
Proposition 3. If ( U; ) solves (P), ( U () ;  ()) = ( U? () ; ? ()) for all  2 [0;  ].
Now consider the problem same to (P) but only with  2 [; I ], denoted by (P), and let
( U; ) be its solution. Since type  is the lowest one in (P) with the recursive structure, it is
awarded the rst-best outcome as under full information: U() = U?() and  () =  ?().
This implies that the initial state of (P) is equal to the optimal terminal state of the problem
with  2 [0;  ]. As long as every type    has no incentive to deviate, by the recursive
structure of (P), the part of its solution over [; I ] is the same to ( U; ).
Lemma 5. If ( U; ) solves (P), ( U () ;  ()) = ( U () ;  ()) for all  2 (; I ].
Notice that the full information Pareto optimum cannot be achieved under asymmetric
information. In the allocation, every type  >  deviated to the contract designed for some
higher type because for  > 
U^(; ) =  (? ()) [fq (q? () ; )  ] q?0 () + [0 (? ())S? ()  ] ?0 ()
+  (? ())  1 [q? () +  (? ())  ] > 0:
As long as the limit of collateralization does not matter, banks can screen borrowers without
welfare loss by lending q? () at the interest rate with no default premium to a type  borrower
and asking for title to x? () of the borrowers collateralable wealth in the event the project
fails. The limit does not matter, and such screening is possible, if and only if the borrowers
collateralable wealth exceeds the collateral required for this, i.e.,   q? () +  (? ()).
The remaining thing is to characterize ( U; ), solving the optimal control problem (P).
As a rst step, the following lemma establishes that the repayment of every type  >  in
the unsuccessful state equals the collateral in an equilibrium.
Lemma 6. In an optimal solution to (P), (5b) is binding over (; I ].
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Proposition 4. If ( U; ) solves (P), then for every  2 (; I ],
q () > q? () ; x () =  1 [q () +  ( ())  (1  )] > x? () ; k () = ; (10)
and generically  () ?  (), where  () satises
0 ( ())

S (q () ; ) +  (q () ; )

f (q () ; ) + 
 1
	
= : (11)
where  (q; )  [fq (q; )] 1 [  fq (q; )]. In addition, U 0 () > 0 for all  2 (; I ].
Regarding the intensive margin, the equilibrium contracts are not so much di¤erent from
those in BT without search frictions. The loan sizes and the collateral requirements are ex-
actly same to those in it, and the interest rates are changed only for zero prots under the
matching technology and capacity expansion costs. For the reason same as under full infor-
mation, the low-risk borrowers, those with  > , puts up the maximum available collateral.
Then collateral cannot be used as a screening device under asymmetric information. How-
ever a contract specifying a suboptimally large loan in conjunction with a high interest rate
is relatively more attractive for a borrower with a higher type.16 Thus, banks sort borrowers
by o¤ering a set of such contracts, and a high type borrower receives a larger loan and pays
more interest than under full information.
A key nding distinguished from BT, in which a randomized loan granting strategy does
not emerge, is the possibility of credit rationing in the extensive margin. Dene  (q; )
such that 0 ( (q; ))S (q; ) = , which indicates the e¢ cient level of market tightness
given loan size q. Because q () > q? () implies that fq (q () ; ) < , the condition (11)
yields  () >  (q () ; ) for all  > . Together with competitive search, screening under
asymmetric information requires that not only borrowers should overinvest, but that banks
should create vacancies more than the e¢ cient number under the overinvestment. However
such overinvestment lowers down the e¢ cient level of vacancy creation:  (q () ; ) < ? ()
16This is because, when fq > 0 in the quasi-linear preference, the marginal rate of substitution between
investment and interest rate is increasing in the success probability . That is, a borrower with a higher
type is willing to pay more for an incremental amount of investment. The sorting property of u stated in
the Appendix holds for this reason.
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for all  since S (q () ; ) < S (q? () ; ) in an equilibrium. Because the screening reduces
socially gains from contracts, it is e¢ cient that banks do not create vacancies as much as
under full information. Clearly the vacancy creation in an equilibrium is less than under full-
information, i.e.,  () < ? (), if and only if the latter channels a stronger e¤ect than the
former, and this situation can be regarded as pure credit rationing. In this case, if banks cut
down interests reducing loan sizes per borrower, the supply of credit would be enhanced in
the extensive margin, and it would be more e¢ cient. Nevertheless this does not occur in an
equilibrium because banks screen borrowers to maximize prots under hidden information.17
Precise analytical analysis for the e¤ects of changes in the model parameters is di¢ cult
without a closed form solution. However, assuming the environment in which the e¤ects
on the loan sizes are relatively small, focus on changes in the market tightness. Then, the
condition (11) shows that a rise in bankscosts  as well as a fall in the value of collateralable
wealth  make the market more tight, lowering down the vacancy-applicant ratio  () for
all . This amplies the increase in interest rate spread x () =q ()  for every  due to the
direct e¤ect. The condition also shows that a fall in the productivity of matching technology,
i.e., decreases in both  () and 0 () for every , has the same e¤ects. These results might
be important for understanding the occurrence of a credit crunch. For example, when banks
have more di¢ culties in nding qualied borrowers, the tightness of credit market may be
endogenously amplied. As discussed in the introduction, the results also help to explain
small enterpriseslimited access to bank nance.
Another key nding of this paper is that there can exist an equilibrium in which some
borrowers of the same type obtain di¤erent contracts. The following proposition establishes
the possibility of such contract dispersion.
Proposition 5. An optimal control trajectory is unique if fqq  0 but not in general. If
both  0 and  1 are optimal control trajectories, q0 () < q1 () implies that 0 () > 1 ().
17The cost of screening is independent of the distribution of borrower types, whereas the collective benet
of screening depends on the distribution. Thus high type borrowers may collectively prefer to cross-subsidize
low type borrowers rather than take costly screening. However, any individual borrower would prefer a
contract that screens out all the lower types, and banks know this.
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Suppose that, for each type , the arrival rate of loan o¤ers  ( ()) were xed at one,
or any exogenously given level, as in BT. Then the equilibrium payo¤ U () only depends
on the surplus S (q () ; ), which is entirely determined by the loan size q () given . Thus,
in the absence of extensive margin, there could not exist more than one optimal contract
since S is strictly decreasing on q > q?. However the competitive search market structure
allows that di¤erent combinations of loan size q () and market tightness  () in each margin
yields the same equilibrium payo¤. If both  0 and  1 are optimal control trajectories and
q0 () < q1 (), contract (q0 () ; x0 () ; ) yields less gains from implementation for type
.18 Nevertheless it can survive in the market with a higher probability of implementation:
0 () > 1 (). This is similar in spirit to wage dispersion in wage posting models with more
than one o¤er (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) as well as price dispersion in the price
posting model of Curtis and Wright (2004). This result is noticeable because it provides an
account for a source of dispersion in the terms of loan other than heterogeneity of borrowers.
It also demonstrates the possibility that sunspots a¤ect the distribution of credit supply. As
discussed in the last section, multiple solutions to (P) does not only allow contract dispersion
in an equilibrium but also yields multiple equilibria. If borrowers obtain di¤erent contracts
in an equilibrium, there is an equilibrium in which borrowers obtain only one of them.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information.
The novelty of the model is that it explicitly captures both intensive and extensive margins
of credit supply, and hence that it is appropriate to show how they jointly operate under
hidden information. Using the model, this paper sheds light on and explains the possibility of
pure credit rationing and contract dispersion among homogeneous borrowers. These are key
ndings distinguished from the results of existing works on a competitive credit market under
18This highlights the role of capacity expansion costs. It states that  (0 ())S (q0 () ; )  0 () is less
than the other though S (q0 () ; ) > S (q1 () ; ). This is possible because banks ask more interests x0 ()
that compensate  (0 ()) >  (1 ()) due to lower success probability. See the proof of Proposition 5.
21
hidden information. This paper also provides a theoretical account that links unproductive
banking as well as lack of collateral to the credit market tightness and interest rate spreads.
The analysis of this paper relies on simplifying assumptions, which preclude us from
analyzing dynamic general equilibrium e¤ects. However the model developed here could be
used as a module of a macroeconomic model, which properly take into account both intensive
and extensive margins of credit supply under asymmetric information. A straightforward way
for this is to use the two-sector framework in new monetarist economics (see Williamson and
Wright, 2011). It is obvious that not only total amount of credit supply but its distribution
matters for macroeconomic performance. Therefore such integration is important in studying
many central issues like monetary policy, credit cycles, and credit market regulation. Clearly
extending the work in this paper by introducing moral hazard as well as potential borrowers
signaling is worthwhile for a more plausible model. Anyhow this paper can be considered as
a reasonable starting point.
Appendix
1 Properties of Preferences
First of all, it is obvious that both u : C D 7! R and v : C D 7! R are continuous. In
addition, C is nonempty and compact in (R3; kk), where kk is the Euclidean norm. Let
C ()  fc 2 C j u (c; )  0; v (c; )  g
denote the set of contracts of which implementation with type  yields nonnegative gains for
both sides, and let N (c)  fc0 2 C j kc0   ck < g be the neighborhood of c with radius .
Monotonicity: For every c 2 C, v (c; ) is increasing.
Proof. Notice that, for c = (q; x; k),
v (c; ) = x  q   (1  )max fx  k; 0g :
For each c 2 C, v (c; ) is constant if x  k, and it is strictly increasing otherwise.
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Local Nonsatiation: For any c 2 [2D C () and  > 0, there exists c0 2 N (c) such that
v (c0; ) > v (c; ) and u (c0; ) < u (c; ) for all .
Proof. Take arbitrary  2 D and c = (q; x; k) 2 C (). Then 0 < x < S? () since c 2 C ().
Thus, for any  > 0, there is x > 0 that allows c0 = (q; x x; k) 2 N (c). This c0 satises
the inequalities since u is strictly decreasing in x while v is strictly increasing in x.
Lemma 7. For any , c 2 C (), and  > 0, there is c0 2 N (c) such that u (c0; 0) > u (c; 0)
for all 0 >  and u (c0; 0) < u (c; 0) for all 0 < .
Proof. Take arbitrary  2 D and c = (q; x; k) 2 C (). Consider c0 = (q +q; x x; k)
with q > 0. Notice that f (q +q; )   f (q; ) is positive and is strictly increasing on
. Since u is continuous and strictly decreasing in x, given q, there exists x > 0 such
that u (c0; ) = u (c; ). It is obvious that this c0 satises the inequalities, and that such x
approaches 0 as q approaches 0. Since c 2 C () implies that q < q () and 0 < x < S? (),
there exists q able to ensure that c0 2 N (c) for any  > 0.
Sorting: For any , c 2 C (), and  > 0, there exists c0 2 N (c) such that u (c0; ) > u (c; )
and u (c0; 0) < u (c; 0) for all 0 <  such that c 2 C (0).
Proof. Take arbitrary pair (; 0) 2 D2 such that 0 <  and c = (q; x; k) 2 C (0)  C ().
Once it is shown that there exists 00 2 (0; ) such that u (c; 00)  0, Lemma 7 completes
the proof since v (c; 0)  v (c; 00)  v (c; ) by the monotonicity. Since u is continuos, it is
obvious that such 00 exists in case that u (c; 0) > 0. If u (c; 0) = 0, its existence is ensured
by u (c; 
0) > 0. Notice that u (c; ) = f (q; ) + f (q; ) if x  k, and that u (c; ) = 0
yields u (c; ) = f (q; ) + k= otherwise.
2 Proof of Lemma 1
First notice that we can rewrite equilibrium condition (i) as: for every c 2 C,  (# (c)) 
p (c), and  (# (c)) = p (c; ) if # (c) <1 and  (c; ) > 0 for some  2 D.
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Take an arbitrary contract c 2 C, and x it. Notice that there should exist some type
 such that  (c; ) > 0 since  (c; ) is a probability measure. Hence the condition implies
that # (c) =1 if p (c) > 1. It also implies that, in case that p (c)  1, p (c) = p (c; ) for
some  such that  (c; ) > 0, or # (c) =1, and hence  (# (c)) = p (c). If p (c) > 1,  (c; )
is arbitrary and immaterial. Otherwise  (c; ) > 0 implies that p (c; ) = p (c).
3 Proof of Lemma 2
For the standard program in Section 4 equivalent to (P), there exists mathematical theory
that proves the lemma directly (see, e.g., Weber, 2011). However, rather than verifying the
applicability of the theory, here it is proved by deriving the continuos type results as the
limit of the discrete type results in GSW.
Suppose that there exist only nite number of borrowerstypes as in GSW. For any given
 2 R++, let i  0 + i for i = 0; 1;    ; n (), where n ()  1 < I   0  n (). Then
dene

Ui; g^i; ci; i
	n()
i=0
by Ui  U (i), g^i  g^ (i), ci  c (i), and i   (i) for every i. In
this case, a Pareto dominating SINC allocation can be found by solving
(P) max
fci;ig
n() 1X
i=0
Uig^i
subject to (C1)-(C4) for all i; j. The continuous type problem (P) is the limit of (P) as 
approaches to 0 becauseZ I
0
U () g^ () d = lim
!0

n() 1X
i=0
U (i) g^ (i) :
Notice that (P) has an equivalent representation in the form of a nested sequence of smaller
optimization problems (see Spence, 1978). For any type i, consider a problem
(Pi) Ui = max
ci2C[f?g;i2R+
 (i)u (ci; i)
subject to
 (i) v (ci; i) = ;  (i)u (ci; j)  Uj; 8j < i: (12)
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The larger problem (~P) of solving (Pi) for all i is equivalent to the problem (P). Notice that
the solution will be unchanged as the rst equality constraint in (12) is replaced by
 (i) v (ci; i)   (13)
since (13) will never be slack. In addition, for all i, the optimal decision about i in R+ is
the same in R+ since i = 1 violates the constraint (13). Therefore the problem (P) as
well as (~P) is equivalent to (P) in GSW. Now one can use all the results in GSW as long as
their assumptions on preferences u and v hold for arbitrarily small . The preferences in
our model satisfy this condition as shown above in the Appendix.
The existence of solution and the uniqueness of optimal state trajectory follow directly
from Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 in GSW. The assumption (1) guarantees that, for every ,
there exists c 2 C with u (c; ) > 0 and v (c; ) > . By Proposition 4 in GSW, this implies
that U () > 0 for all  on the optimal state trajectory.
4 Proofs of Proposition 2
The following denition of competitive search equilibrium in the unrestricted model with
policy posting is a natural generalization of its denition in the restricted model with contract
posting. Let p (c; ) denote the probability density function associated with p (c; ).
Denition 5. A competitive search equilibrium with revelation policies is a list of functions
f	p; #p;p; Ug, where 	p is a measure on a -algebra of C with support C	p , #p : C 7! R+,
p : C  BD 7! [0; 1], and U : D 7! R+, that satises the following conditions:
(i) For every (c; ) 2 CD, Up (c; ;#p)  U ()  maxc^2C	p[f?g Up (c^; ;#p), with equality
and u (c () ; )  0 if #p (c) <1 and p (c; ) > 0;
(ii) For everyc 2 C,  (c;#p;p)  0, with equality ifc 2 C	p ;
(iii)
R
C	p [
p (c; ) =#p (c)] 	p (dc)  g () for every  2 D, with equality if U () > 0.
The proposition follows directly from the proof of Proposition 5 in GSW.
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5 Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that U 0 ()  0 for almost every . Since (P) has the recursive structure, it is enough
to show that there is no incentive to deviate to the contract designed for a higher type. See
the proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that there exists 0 >  such that U(0; ) > U(; ) for some
. Then
R 0

U^(~; )d~ > 0. The assumption implies that U^(~; ~)  U^(~; )  U^(; ) for
almost every ~ 2 [; 0], and hence that R 0

U^(~; ~)d~ > 0. This contradicts the rst order
condition that U^(~; ~) = 0 for almost every ~.
6 Proof of Lemma 4
Since ? as well as q? is strictly increasing, it is obvious that
J ()  (?())(q?()  ) + ?() > 0
for all  >  if q?()  , and that J ()  0 for all  if q?(1)  . In case that q?() < 
and q?(1) > , lim! J () < 0 since ? () ! 0 as  ! , and J (1) > 0. Since J is
strictly increasing, this implies that there exists unique  2 (; 1) such that J () = 0.
7 Proof of Proposition 3
Taking   =  ?, we have
U(0; ) =  (? (0))S (q? (0) ; )  ? (0) ; 8; 0 2 [0;  ]:
For every , (q? () ; ? ()) is a solution to the maximization problem in (8). Thus, for any  2
[0;  ], there cannot exist 
0 2 [0;  ] such that U(0; ) > U(; ), and ( U?; ?) satises the
global incentive compatibility constraints. Since the solution to the unconstrained problem
satises the constraints, it is the solution to the constrained problem.
8 Proof of Lemma 5
The only thing we need to prove is that any type  2 [0;  ] has no incentive to deviate from
 ?. Deviating to the contract designed for a type 0 > , the type  obtains
U(0; ) =  (? (0))S (q? (0) ; )  ? (0)
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if k? (0)  x? (0). Clearly, in this case, it has no incentive to deviate since (q? () ; ? ()) is
a solution to the maximization problem in (8). If k? (0) < x? (0), the type  obtains
U(0; ) =  (? (0)) [S (q? (0) ; )  (0   ) k? (0)]  ? (0) :
Thus it has no incentive to deviate to the contract designed for a type 0 > .
9 Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose not, and let ( U; ) be a solution such that, for some  > ,
x () + (1  ) k () > q () +  ( ()) : (14)
Then (5a) holds as an equality for , and this implies that
U(0; ) =  ( (0))S (q (0) ; )   (0) :
For the incentive compatibility, i.e.  2 argmax^2D U(^; ), it must hold that q () = q? ()
and  () = ? (). But this contradicts the assumption because
x? () = q? () +  (? ()) >   k? ()
for  > , whereas (14) implies that k () < x () if (5a) holds as an equality.
10 Proof of Proposition 4
First notice that, by Lemma 6, (7) becomes
U 0 () =  ( ())

f (q () ; ) + f (q () ; )   1q () +  1k ()
   1 () (15)
 ' (q () ;  () ; k () ; ) :
Consider an optimal control problem
(P) max
U();q();();k()
Z I

U () g^ () d
subject to, for all  2 [; I ], (6), (15), 0  k ()  , and the initial condition U() = U?().
The relaxed version of (P) consists of (P) and (5b) holding as an equality.
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Letting U be the state variable,   (q; ; k) the vector of control variables, and & the
costate variable, Lagrangian for (P) is
L   U;; &; ;  = Ug^ ()+ &' (q; ; k; )+[ () [f (q; )  q]   U ]+ (  k) ; (16)
where   (; ) is the vector of multipliers. The Pontryagin maximum principle calls for
(i) maximality: for all ,
Lq = (+  1&) [fq (q; )  ] + &fq (q; ) = 0; (17)
L = (+  1&) [0 () ff (q; )  qg   ] + &0 () [f (q; ) +  1k] = 0; (18)
Lk =  1& ()    0; = 0 if k > 0; (19)
together with ;   0 and the complementary slackness conditions
[ () ff (q; )  qg      U ] = 0;  (  k) = 0;
(ii) adjoint equation:
 & 0 () = L U = g^ ()   () 8; (20)
(iii) transversality: & (I) = 0.
Let ( U; ) be a solution to (P). Notice that (P) has an equivalent representation
max
U();()
Z I

[ ( ()) ff (q () ; )  q ()g    ()] g^ () d
subject to the same constraints but
 ( ()) ff (q () ; )  q ()g    ()  U () (21)
instead of (6). By rearranging (6), we see that L U = g^ ()   () is the Lagrange multiplier
for (21). Since L U > 0 if and only if U () < U? (), by the adjoint equation (20), & 0 () < 0
for all  2 (; I ]. Together with the transversality condition, this implies that & () > 0 for
all  2 [; I). In addition, L U = g^ () if and only if & () U0 () = 0 as well as U () < U? ().
If U () < U? (), & () > 0 implies that U0 () > 0 because (18) yields
0 ()

f (q; ) + f (q; )   1q +  1k
  ; = 0 if  = 0
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and  () > 0 (). Therefore  () > 0 for all  2 [; I) and  (I) = 0.
Since  () ; & () ; U0 () > 0 for all  2 (; I), for every  2 (; I ], fq (q () ; ) < 
by (17) implies that q () > q? (), and  () > 0 by (19) implies that k () = . Together
with k () = , Lemma 6 yields x () in (10), and combining (17) and (18) leads to the
condition (11). Though this characterizes a solution to the relaxed problem with a local
representation of the incentive compatibility constraint, Lemma 3 ensures that the solution
is globally incentive compatible.
11 Proof of Proposition 5
Take an arbitrary  2 (; I ], and x it. The condition for the uniqueness comes from the
condition (17). Since fqq < 0,   fq (q; ) is strictly increasing on q. Thus, given &;  > 0,
a loan size q that satises the condition is unique in case that fq is decreasing on q.
Let q0 and q1 > q0 satisfy (17), and let 0 and 1 satisfy (11) given q0 and q1 respec-
tively. In principle, the relative size between the two levels of market tightness is arbitrary,
depending on the shapes of f and . However, since the optimal payo¤s must be the same,
U  J (S (q0; ) ; 0)  J (S (q1; ) ; 1) = 0;
where J (S; )   ()S  . Notice that the condition (11) with fq (q; ) <  ensures that
J = 
0 ()S    < 0. In addition, JS  Sq < 0 since JS =  () > 0 and Sq < 0 for q > q?.
Thus U = 0 implies that 0 > 1.
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